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Abstract
Information systems are subject to continuous change.
In order to conduct empirical research on methods
for software evolution, CoCoME was developed as a
community-driven case study system. It is, however,
not suitable for the validation of security-related ap-
proaches, as neither security nor privacy have been ad-
dressed in any evolution scenario. We elicited 53 secu-
rity requirements coming from law, security guidelines
and known threats. In this paper, we present three
out of twelve security requirement categories including
one representative requirement and share our experi-
ence in building the foundation for a security-oriented
evolution scenario. Researchers in the field of secure
software evolution can validate their approaches using
this future evolution scenario.
1 Introduction
Companies operate information systems over decades.
These systems are subject to continuous change. Ac-
cording to Lehman [1], this process of updating vari-
ous parts of the system for different reasons is called
software evolution. Case studies enable validating the
effectiveness of software evolution methods. These
case studies evolve through joint collaboration in cer-
tain communities. CoCoME, the Common Compo-
nent Modeling Example, is such a community case
study for collaborative empirical research on software
evolution approaches [2]. The resulting case study
platform consists of three parts: artifacts like require-
ments and source code representing the information
system, an evolution scenario describing the evolu-
tion subject, and interconnected activities implement-
ing one or more evolution scenarios [5]. CoCoME is
a comprehensive case study representing a retail sys-
tem of a supermarket as illustrated in Figure 1. It
started as a monolithic system consisting of one enter-
prise, with an enterprise server and database, a chain
of stores, where each store server is connected to the
enterprise server, and each store server containing a
cash-desk line, where each cash-desk PC is connected
to the store server. Cashiers scan products at the cash
desk. Customers pay by credit card or cash.
One evolution scenario [9] for the previously closed
system is migrating the enterprise server and database
Figure 1: Simplified CoCoME architecture
into the cloud and introducing a web service for cus-
tomers. The business goal, is to reduce operating costs
and establish a flexible adaptation and reconfiguration
of these system parts to meet new customer require-
ments. With this evolution scenario, use cases change
along with system boundaries. Thus, CoCoME be-
comes a more open system, as now several system
parts interact with other information systems in the
internet. This not only raises the potential attack
surface, but also paves the way for new threats, for
example data breaches in cloud systems [11]. The
bigger attack surface, law compliance, and security
of critical business data require dedicated handling
of security. CoCoME, however, does not address se-
curity aspects such as confidentiality, integrity, and
privacy in any evolution scenario. Thus, validation of
security-related approaches is not possible yet.
In order to make CoCoME representative in terms
of security and privacy, a security evolution scenario
has to be defined. This evolution scenario has to start
with business goals, define corresponding security re-
quirements and develop use cases on this basis. To ad-
dress security systematically in all system parts of Co-
CoME, the security requirements have to be elicited
from various sources like known attacks on web ser-
vices, security guidelines for information systems and
cloud, as well as laws concerning trading systems. As
there are, neither a security evolution scenario nor
ready to use security requirements for CoCoME, we
started to define a security evolution scenario.
This evolution scenario defines how CoCoME will ad-
dress security and privacy issues. Our goal was not to
provide a complete set of security requirements but to
define requirements representative for the European
Union (EU) which establish a minimum level of se-
curity for the overall CoCoME system. We analyzed
the German law for IT-supported accounting systems
(GoBD [4]), the security guidelines for information
systems (IT-Grundschutz [3, 7]) based on ISO 27001
and 27002, an EU-approved cloud certification guide-
line (Cloud Security Certification (CSC) TÜV [12]),
and some favorable and known attacks on web services
[13, 15]. Except of GoBD, all sources are intuitively
representative for the EU. Therefore, we generalized
the GoBD requirements by replacing concrete require-
ments such as the retention time of data with place-
holders. After we had elicited requirements from these
sources, we checked their applicability on CoCoME
and dropped requirements which were not reasonable.
For instance, we omitted organizational requirements
regarding filling a vacancy. For each remaining re-
quirement, we mapped use cases and CoCoME sys-
tem parts that have to change. Requirement cate-
gories structure elicited security requirements regard-
ing their similarity, always keeping source traces.
The resulting security requirement list consisted of
twelve categories and 53 requirements. Eight of these
53 requirements were not assigned to a specific cat-
egory, as there was no other similar requirement for
each of them. The security requirements serve as a
foundation for the development of a security evolution
scenario for CoCoME. This evolution scenario will es-
tablish security and privacy in CoCoME enabling us
and other researchers to use CoCoME as a case study
for the validation of security-related approaches. Fur-
ther, the introduced categories can be reused for ex-
ample in other trading systems as a starting point and
structure for the elicitation of security requirements.
In this paper, we share our experience in defining a
CoCoME security evolution scenario and exemplify its
usage. Section 2 reports on three representative secu-
rity requirements from different categories. A discus-
sion of our methodology and our experiences takes
place in Section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Excerpt of Security Requirement
Categories
Because trading systems such as CoCoME have a va-
riety of stakeholders, different sources serve as a ba-
sis for the elicitation of security requirements. These
sources, as described in the previous section, corre-
spond to different aspects of security. After elicita-




Secured transfer of sensitive
information
Access Control Access control system
Data Separation Data validation and sanitiza-
tion
Table 1: Summary of suggested categories and repre-
sentative requirements.
egories, based on their similarities such as goals, appli-
cations, etc. For the sake of brevity, we only describe
representative requirements that show major aspects
of the three categories shown in Table 1. Each of these
categories combines results from various sources.
2.1 Confidential Communication
Secure communication summarizes requirements on
information exchange between system parts regarding
confidentiality and integrity. In this context, confiden-
tiality means that no unauthorized party can intercept
communication and gain knowledge about transmit-
ted information apart from size and frequency of mes-
sages. Integrity means that no third party can alter
communication unnoticed. Out of five requirements,
two requirements describe general secure communica-
tion. The remaining three requirements define specific
communications to be secured.
A typical requirement is to ask for “secured transfer
of sensitive information”. The meaning of security
matches the definition above. Sensitive information
is not clearly specified because the requirement orig-
inated from the cloud certification guideline of TÜV
Rheinland [12], which does not target a specific do-
main such as point-of-sale systems. For CoCoME,
a) the information about the customers and users of
the system, as well as their credentials and payment
data, b) sale-related communication, and c) informa-
tion about ordering or exchange of products is sensi-
tive. To be more general, all communications between
coarse-grained components are affected. Losing secu-
rity properties for one of these communications might
lead to serious impact on the business.
The secure communication requirements allow us to
validate approaches that address confidentiality and
integrity for communication links. The approaches
can perform very basic security tests such as detect-
ing anti-patterns of unencrypted links in a way threat
modeling would do. More sophisticated approaches
that, for instance, determine security properties of
certain data classes can use the requirements that are
more specific about the information to protect. The
latter is subject to our current research [10].
2.2 Access Control
The category access control describes a group of sim-
ilar security requirements which describe how the ac-
cess to the information systems data, resources and
services shall look like and how this access shall be
managed. Precisely, this category contains require-
ments which pertain the access restriction from in-
side and outside, as well as the system that enforces
access control. Requirements concerning appropriate
authorization and therefore authentication, like user
authentication mechanisms, as well as management
and administration of all needed information, belongs
also to this category. Eleven requirements, one from
the law GoBD, seven from the security guideline IT-
Grundschutz and three from the security guideline
CSC TÜV are part of this category.
One typical requirement is called “access control sys-
tem” and is derived from the IT-Grundschutz of the
Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) [3]. It
demands individually designed access rights for all
roles (e.g. cashier, store manager) in CoCoME. The
design of access rights has to be aligned with the role’s
tasks to allow for performing all its tasks without any
disruption. It also demands establishing of a system
for management and enforcement of access rights over
all various CoCoME information systems.
Every security-related approach with focus on access
control will benefit from the realization of this require-
ment in CoCoME. In our research, we focus on a spe-
cific access control paradigm, namely role-based ac-
cess control. We elicit role models with a hierarchy
containing access rights by analyzing business pro-
cesses. Therefore, CoCoME needs dedicated access
control to be used as a validation for our security-
related approach. Once it will be established, we will
use it as a case study for illustration and validation of
the algorithm which elicits the roles and their access
rights.
2.3 Data Separation
Data separation handles a broad context. It becomes
especially vital with cloud-based applications, which
leverage virtualized environments sharing the under-
lying resources. Data separation can be defined as
the separation of information or resources from each
other, such as personal or commercial data of one cus-
tomer from another. Cloud applications are multi-
tenant, which raises multiple questions: Are data and
resources residing on the same virtual environment
and on the same physical infrastructure safe? For in-
stance, the iObserve approach [8] addresses this issue
implied by an evolution scenario regarding database
migration and privacy laws. The approach determines
the physical location of the database and checks if the
database remains in a permitted set of locations. As
you see, the aspect of data separation is more relevant
to data privacy or compliance, and there are regional
as well as international institutions trying to regulate
such issues or introduce countermeasures like separa-
tion or geo-localization of private data [14], [6].
Data separation is a countermeasure for several at-
tacks that become possible by introducing the pick-up
shop [9] to CoCoME, where customers make purchases
over the internet and pick up their merchandise later
at the store. Attackers can leverage the new interface,
i.e. the according web service, for threatening the Co-
CoME system. Data separation has to be strongly
considered in this area. So, one concrete requirement
of the data separation category is defined as the tu-
ple of “data validation and sanitization”. Assume an
attacker with capabilities to issue an XSS attack, e.g.
persisting cross-site scripting, which is one of the most
common input vulnerabilities in web-based applica-
tions [16]. Without going further into detail, a very
conceptual mechanism to avoid easy persistent cross
site scripting is data separation. For example, keep-
ing untrusted data separate or at least validated from
the active browser content is not the separation of any
data, but decoupling of data and applications. An ex-
ample would be an interpreter behind the web client
that needs proper input data for further processing.
This is a different issue from multi-tenancy, since it is
not just addressing the cloud-based application logic
of CoCoME, but is also relevant for other components
in its architecture, such as the pick-up shop compo-
nents representing the web interface.
Elicitation of requirements based on some known at-
tacks is also a bit different than elicitation from exist-
ing laws and regulations, which are well-documented,
maintained and generally accepted. Deriving possibil-
ities of attacks from use cases and system properties
and using them as necessary information sources for
deciding the requirements can be error-prone, com-
pared to two other approaches. Still, interpreting the
attackers as the “malicious” users of the system and
their attacks as the “miss”use cases, has the advantage
of being the lowest-level approach to the CoCoME
cloud application. This and the necessary modeling
of threats are subject to our research as well.
3 Discussion
We want to discuss the completeness and representa-
tiveness of our results, as well as share our experience
a) in using the types of sources mentioned above, and
b) in using the methodology to mine the resulting re-
quirements and categories.
The most important properties of our results are com-
pleteness and representativeness. We did not focus
on completeness intentionally. Therefore, the results
cannot be complete with respect to possible sources.
We, however, argue that this is not necessary or
even possible. A system can never be completely
secure. Therefore, even complete requirements can-
not make a system completely secure, which inval-
idates the benefit of completeness. In contrast, we
focused on representativeness, which makes resulting
requirements and evolution scenarios applicable for
more approaches. We consider our results represen-
tative because we covered various source categories:
general implementation guidelines cover technical low-
level requirements, certification guidelines cover high-
level technical requirements, and basic security re-
quirements (IT-Grundschutz) cover the state of the
art. We even considered laws and derived technical
requirements. The correctness of requirements stems
from the correctness of our sources. The categoriza-
tion done by three people can be considered correct.
Our experiences in using the mentioned sources vary
depending on the type of source. Working with
sources considering technical aspects was straight-
forward: requirements regarding deployment or in-
frastructure already provide the system design gran-
ularity that matches the CoCoME granularity. We
raised the abstraction level of requirements regarding
implementation details such as encryption algorithms
used or discarded them if this was not possible. This
step makes the requirement elicitation fuzzier, but is
necessary because technical requirements often target
implementations rather than design. Compared to
technical sources, we spent more effort in mining ju-
ristic sources. First, we dropped all organizational re-
quirements such as hiring a data protection officer be-
cause these aspects are not covered by CoCoME yet.
Second, we extracted technical requirements by un-
derstanding and interpreting laws. Checklists based
on laws could save effort, but are not possible because
laws usually have to be interpreted for a given use
case. Thus, handling legal sources in a reproducible
and systematic way is not possible.
The methodology we applied provided us with con-
siderable results. We were able to mine requirements
from various sources following a predefined process.
In contrast to this, consolidating these requirements
is pretty tough: even if we were able to define cate-
gories for requirements to group them according to
overlapping concerns, summarizing a category is a
highly creative process. The major challenge is find-
ing a representation that covers all aspects of the input
requirements and still keeps the summarized require-
ment checkable in the system to be implemented. We,
however, argue that summarizing requirements is not
always necessary. For defining an evolution scenario,
simply ensuring that all requirements of a category
can be realized is sufficient.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented three out of twelve se-
curity requirement categories for CoCoME as well as
the methodology for mining them and the contained
requirements. We want to use the 53 security require-
ments for defining a CoCoME evolution scenario that
provides a case study for validating security-related
evolution approaches. We argued that the results
are sufficient for this purpose. The major challenges
in creating the categories were the handling of legal
sources and summarizing requirements.
Researchers evaluating security evolution approaches,
i.e. approaches that target access control, confiden-
tiality, integrity, and authenticity in the architectural
design phase, benefit from the requirements and the
evolution scenario to be defined
Future work includes reviewing the consolidated re-
quirements and releasing a technical report that cov-
ers all requirements as well as the definition of a Co-
CoME evolution scenario.
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ordnungsmäßigen Führung und Aufbewahrung von
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